Gamecocks’ defense lives the bend-don’t-break lifestyle. Will it stay that way?

Those three words strung together become something football fans loathe.

Bend. Don’t. Break.

It’s a phrase with a lot of baggage. It’s linked to the idea of “zone defense,” which to many denotes a kind of softness. It’s often described as some brand of prevent, which is usually more a feeling of dread than any actual tactic (oh, the phrase “prevent defense prevents you from winning” will be brought up).

But the past two years, and even going a little farther back for Will Muschamp, South Carolina’s defense has not only produced the numbers of a bend-don’t-break defense, but USC has done it rather well.

The coach has talked about big-play prevention often. SBNation posted parts of an old playbook from a Nick Saban team, and there were explosive play guidelines and emphases. Muschamp still uses the same things.

The numbers

One of the better current ways to measure if a defense fits the bend-don’t-break profile comes from the numbers of SBNation’s Bill Connelly.

When a team emphasizes not allowing explosive plays, it’s often because it wants to make an offense work. Big plays are bailouts. But a college offense often can’t string together eight, 10 or 12 methodical plays without something going wrong, falling behind the chains and needing something big.

Connelly uses a number that measures how good teams are at stringing together those plays (it’s called success rate), which shows how good a team is at staying ahead of the chains, setting up good second and third downs or just getting first downs. He also has a metric that measures how explosive the big plays are.

These numbers, along with a good measure of converting scoring chances into points, give a bit of a picture of what a defense might be aiming for.

The history

Last year’s Gamecocks fit a particular profile in this regard.

The team was decently stout against the run. It didn’t give up big plays through the air (sixth against explosive plays), but teams could move the ball down the field (86th in opponents’ passing success rate).

It somewhat matches a team that plays a lot of cover-3 defense, with an extra body in the box and outside corners having deep responsibilities and giving up the short stuff on the outside.

Factoring in pass and run, USC was 20th nationally in big-play prevention, 60th in letting opponents move the ball. The Gamecocks ranked a respectable 24th in points allowed when opponents got inside their 40-yard line. The only blemish was allowing opponents to convert a high rate of third downs (this number informed by the fact opponents had to face shorter third downs than the average college team).

That’s been the pattern the past few seasons for Muschamp, dating back to his time at Auburn and in some sense Florida.

2016 Gamecocks: 17th against explosive plays, 95th in stopping opponents from driving.

2015 Auburn: 7th against explosive plays, 97th in stopping opponents from driving.

2014 Florida: 8th against explosive plays, 20th in stopping opponents from driving.

That last Florida team featured gobs and gobs of talent, and the simple truth is when a team has the likes of Dante Fowler, Jr. and Jonathan Bullard, with Marcus Maye, Keanu Neal, Vernon Hargreaves III and Jalen Tabor patrolling the secondary, a staff can do a lot.

But despite that pattern, Muschamp has some history with the more aggressive defenses, or at least balanced in the final product.

His 2013 Florida team was notably better at stopping opponents from driving (6th) nationally. The 2012 team was dominant at both, the 2011 one solid, though still slanting more bend-don’t break vs. the pass. His last Texas team was more in line with the 2013 squad.

The risks and rewards

Going with this approach, or the inverse, has its set of tradeoffs.

Moving the ball (success rate) has a higher correlation to winning than producing/preventing explosive plays. What this often means is, bend-don’t-break defense usually has a higher floor, but a lower ceiling.

That sort of scheme will make a team work downfield, but when an opponent is precise enough to do that consistently, a team ends up putting a lot on its red zone work. The plus side is most college teams just aren’t that consistent.

The opposite would be teams that aim to force more three-and-outs, even at the risk of giving up big plays. This places a premium on coaching, and more importantly talent. Those teams need corners who can cover for a long time and great pass rushers.

A good example of that in recent years sits across the state in Clemson. The Tigers have been prone to allowing big gains (the national title team in 2016 was something like 85th in allowing explosive plays). They also forced three-and-outs on around 40 percent of their opponents’ drives the past two seasons. USC last season was closer to 25 percent.

It’s worth noting, with the talent Clemson has assembled, a coordinator has a good bit more leeway.

Other defenses in that mold include Michigan State and Pitt, the latter of which shows the issues. The Panthers have bled big plays the past few years, and often haven’t gotten enough stops to counteract that.

Then there are defenses such as Alabama and last year’s Tigers, which simply dominate on both fronts.

Will it continue?

The question going forward comes down to this: Is this simply the identity this staff wants for this squad, or is it primarily a response to a grab bag of inherited and hastily assembled talent?

Muschamp on multiple occasions has said he’ll play his defensive backs up tighter when he has defensive backs who can credibly do it. He and other staffers have said the best answer to the RPO plays that have proliferated across the sport is being able to man up, which trends toward the higher-risk, higher-reward side of things.

Defensive line coach Lance Thompson and Muschamp mentioned linemen and linebackers fit run first, often putting more on the secondary. Linebacker coach Coleman Hutzler echoed the point.

The defensive coordinator, Travaris Robinson, was asked about the next step from the bend-don’t-break approach, and his answer was simple: dominate.

Maybe that points to a change, but Muschamp was also asked, and he said this:

“The two most critical factors in winning and losing a football game, No. 1 is the ball, creating turnovers,” Muschamp said. “Then the second thing is explosive plays. A 10-yard or more run. A 20-yard or more pass. That affects field position. It affects momentum of the game.”

So those are still the biggest points. Up next, tightening up things on third and 3 to third and 7, the issue last season. That, Muschamp said, comes back to playing man coverage and, in those spots, playing “deny the ball defense.”

At the moment, it sounds like things will be what they’ve been, with general improvements and tightening up a key problem area.

But how that plays out when the games are live, just depends on how things break (or bend).

This story was originally published August 30, 2018 at 1:59 PM.